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Text properties perceived as captivating and 
entertaining 
A B S T R A C T   
The choice, or invention, of protagonists is an important part of the poetics and aesthetics of 
narratives and dramas. Aristotle stipulated that, for the purposes of engaging the readers or 
onlookers, protagonists should neither be excessively good nor excessively bad, leaving room for 
much variation in the middle-ground (Aristotle, 1961). A theoretical model of the enjoyment of 
negative emotions in art reception (Menninghaus et al., 2017) supports the conclusion that 
aesthetically preferred choices of characters may not be equally distributed between the poles of 
saints and villains, but show a bias towards the latter. We experimentally tested this assumption 
by presenting an identical excerpt from a novel by José Saramago to participants, while exclu-
sively inserting a few words of background information which cast the protagonist’s distant past 
either in a morally good, bad, or evil light. Compared to the good character version, the bad 
character version indeed had an enhancing effect on scales for “suspenseful,” “captivating,” and 
“entertaining,” and no adverse effect on any of the seven other aesthetically evaluative di-
mensions. Fully supporting Aristotle’s thumb rule, none of these enhancing effects of character 
Badness on aesthetic perception/evaluation compared to the good character condition extended 
to the evil character version. Moreover, moral evilness of the protagonist had an adverse effect on 
sympathy, though not on empathy. In contrast, the good and the bad character versions were 
rated equally not only on empathy, but also on sympathy scales.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. The theoretical framework of the present study 
Writers of speeches and literary artworks strive to capture and maintain attention, elicit intense emotional involvement, provide 
inherent processing pleasure, and leave behind a lasting impact on their readers’ memory. The many recipes provided by rhetoric and 
poetics can largely be related to these four goals of the arts (cf. Lausberg, 1998; Quintilian, 1953). At the same time, recent 
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psychological research suggests quite generally that a distinctly strong grip on attention and emotion as well as a privileged access to 
and storage in memory may be better served by negative than by positive emotions: “Bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister, Brat-
slavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001; see also Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Frijda, 1988; Larsen & Prizmic, 2008; Musch & Klauer, 2003; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish, Grossmann & Woodward, 2008). 
This negativity bias of our attentional, emotional, memory, and action response dispositions is typically explained in evolutionary 
terms: If our ancestors failed to swiftly respond to a threat, they may not have had a second chance; however, if they missed a positive 
opportunity, they would still have had another chance. Of course, in positive psychology, the formula “bad is stronger than good” only 
amounts to a sober diagnosis of an unfortunate, although evolutionary adaptive negativity bias of our emotion system; it is not meant 
to be a clever recipe for strongly enjoyable artworks. 
Yet, as highlighted by Menninghaus et al. (2017), many novels and dramas that are obviously enjoyed by many readers are, in fact, 
about failing marriages, unhappy love, adultery, betrayed friendship, and the like. Moreover, we apparently enjoy immoral actions of 
characters in various entertainment contexts, such as video games (e.g., Anderson & Dill, 2000; Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010; Paik & 
Comstock, 1994; Shafer, 2009; see also McGraw & Warren, 2010) and written narratives (Krakowiak & Tsay, 2011; Tsay & Krakowiak, 
2011). Recent TV series such as Breaking Bad, The Sopranos, and House of Cards show a particularly pronounced focus on morally bad 
figures (Bernardelli, 2016; Croci, Monegato & Pasolini, 2016; Garcia, 2016; Salgaro & Van Tourhout, 2018; Vaage, 2016). 
Against this background, and adopting the formula “Bad is stronger than good” as a guiding assumption, the present study tested 
experimentally whether or not a protagonist with a morally “bad” past is indeed associated with more intense enjoyment when 
compared to one with a morally “good” past. In order to test a potentially non-linear dynamics of the hypothetical preference for 
badness in accord with inverted u-shape phenomena stipulated and reported in empirical aesthetics (Berlyne, 1971, 1974), we also 
created an “evil” character version. For all conditions, we presented our study participants with the initial pages of José Saramago’s 
novel Blindness (1995). The experimental modification was limited to the insertion of a few words which refer in a very abstract fashion 
to good, bad, and evil deeds the three characters had respectively committed many years ago. 
Cognitive framing studies have shown that the top-down cognitive classification of something as an artwork or media product 
rather than a part of ordinary reality provides some psychological distance, thereby rendering bad characters, bad deeds, and even 
feelings of disgust and anger more readily compatible with enjoyment (for the concept of cognitive framing, see Abelson, 1981; Brewer 
& Nakamura, 1984; for the concept of psychological distance, see Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman & Wakslak, 2007; for 
articles on the distancing effects of cognitive art framings, see Altmann, Bohrn, Lubrich, Menninghaus & Jacobs, 2014; Bullough, 1912; 
Cupchik, 2002; Wagner et al., 2015; Wagner, Menninghaus, Hanich & Jacobsen, 2014; Zwaan, 1994). However, cognitive psycho-
logical distancing alone would reduce absolute levels of attention and affective involvement rather than elevate them to higher levels. 
Such distancing therefore cannot by itself explain the positive aesthetic enjoyment apparently associated with bad protagonists and 
morally bad behaviour. Similarly, moral disengagement (Breithaupt, 2016; Fast & Van Reet, 2018; Keen, 2007)––which might be 
associated with the more general psychological distancing resulting from a cognitive fiction (non-reality) framing––can by itself only 
support moral indifference regarding good and bad acts. Such indifference might suffice to explain the absence of adverse effects of 
moral badness on the enjoyment of fictional narratives; however, the positive dimensions and sources of enjoyment that become 
possible in the absence of standard morality checks require additional psychological mechanisms. 
The present study is neither about the potential evolutionary underpinnings of our fascination for perpetrators and evil deeds, nor is 
it about differences in the enjoyment of negative emotional content that depend on an ontological classification as ordinary reality vs. 
fictional artworks. Rather, we took the findings of cognitive framing-studies on the latter issue for granted and exclusively investigated 
the following questions: How do graded differences in negative emotional content affect the processing of a literary narrative within a 
fictional frame? More specifically, to what degree can negative emotional responses go far beyond merely being somewhat contained by 
the cognitive art framing and instead end up being positively conducive to aesthetic enjoyment? 
A theoretical model of the aesthetic enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception (Menninghaus et al., 2017) guided our efforts. 
The model stipulates that emotions that include both positive and negative emotional ingredients can be instrumental for integrating 
the power of negative emotions into an overall positive enjoyment. More specifically, the model discussed feelings of being moved and 
suspense as two preeminent cases that conform to this assumption (for details and empirical evidence regarding being moved, see 
Hanich, Wagner, Shah, Jacobsen & Menninghaus, 2014; Menninghaus et al., 2015, 2019). Feelings of suspense include, in dynamically 
fluctuating proportions, both fearful and hopeful anticipations regarding the upcoming events and the final outcome of a narrative 
trajectory (Madrigal & Bee, 2005; Moulard, Kroff & Folse, 2012; Zillmann, 1996). Moreover, they are often explicitly cited as reasons 
for aesthetic liking (Carroll, 1996a, 1996b; Knoop, Wagner, Jacobsen & Menninghaus, 2016)—that is, a narrative may be enjoyed 
because it takes its readers through a suspenseful trajectory that also includes feelings of fear. Hence if, everything else being equal, a 
bad character renders a narrative more suspenseful than a good character does, this could be understood to imply that the bad 
character is instrumental for pushing a key reward dimension of reading narratives to higher levels. Suspense was therefore a 
particularly important response dimension in our query for aesthetic benefits of character badness in narratives. 
1.2. The present study 
In a case study we experimentally tested whether adding negative vs. positive character information to the beginning of José 
Saramago’s novel Blindness (1995) would lead to differences in readers’ cognitive and affective processing as well as their aesthetic 
evaluation of the passage. In the novel, a man driving a car suddenly becomes blind while waiting at a red traffic light, and the passage 
we selected for our study subsequently portrays how it feels to move through the world immediately after losing one’s sight and how 
the driver’s wife deals with the completely unexpected predicament of becoming her husband’s caretaker. Throughout the original 
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passage presented, readers are not given any explicit information about the private or professional past of the protagonists. As the focus 
is all on the sudden blinding and the subsequent efforts to bring the blinded driver home, we expected readers to perceive the pre-
dicament of the two protagonists quite generally with high levels of empathy regardless of potential version differences. 
For our study, we slightly shortened the passage by leaving out several references to passers-by. Our experimental modifications 
consisted in adding––spread across the excerpt––four short insertions that cast a morally “good,” “bad,” or “evil” light on the character 
dependant on what he had done in his past professional life (for all details, see Supplemental Information Table S1). Compared to the 
total length of the original excerpt (2380 words), the word count for the four insertions was marginal (a total of 57, 62, and 64 words 
for the three versions, respectively). In the “good” variant, the man was a doctor who had worked for a while in a hospital in Africa and 
had saved many patients; in the “bad” variant, he had previously served in an Egyptian secret service prison and was involved in 
procedures of torture. In a third (“evil”) variant, the character was identified as a former doctor who had killed prisoners in a con-
centration camp during World War II. 
Regarding the verbal proxies (“good” vs. “bad” vs. “evil”) chosen to designate the three text versions, we’d like to emphasize that 
these labels were not used in our instruction at all and hence did not prime the way participants perceived the text versions. To be sure, 
a doctor participating in torture commits crimes against humanity and could therefore also be considered as a morally “evil” person. 
Still, only the Nazi doctor was portrayed as violating the Hippocratic oath (i.e., to save and preserve lives) to the most abominable 
degree (i.e., by intentionally killing persons). We therefore expected that the respective effects of these pieces of character information 
on moral evaluation and sympathy would differ. In order to avoid contrasting a “good” character against two grades of an “evil” 
character, we preferred to speak of a “good,” a “bad,” and an “evil” character (again, without giving any such summarizing label to the 
three characters in the textual modifications distinguishing them). 
Our topical triad of the good, the bad and the evil departs from the triad of “good,” bad,” and “ambiguous” which guided a 
comparable previous study (Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012) in two regards. First, in our case, “bad” is not the most negative label, but 
“evil;” this was designed to enable us to observe the potential turnaround of character badness from an aesthetic virtue into a vice at 
extreme levels. Second, we are doubtful that “ambiguous” is indeed––as suggested by Krakowiak and Oliver (2012)––a well-fitting 
label for the character of persons who do both good and bad things. Essentially, according to common wisdom, most humans do 
both good and bad things. They occasionally lie, fail to help other people in need, are not always and not for each person reliable, etc., 
even if they are generally responsible and well-behaving. This, however, does not suffice to label them “ambiguous.” As a semiotic 
category, ambiguity is defined by entailing conflicting meaning dimensions, or giving room to very different interpretations, of the 
same word, the same act, or the same stance towards a particular conflict. This crucial feature of identical reference is not given in the 
text versions produced by Krakowiak and Oliver (2012). Persons who just do bad things in some regards and good things in others and 
on other occasions can well be said to have a mixed moral record (as most humans) but they are not necessarily “ambiguous,” let alone 
fully “ambivalent” characters in any stricter meaning. This was a second reason why we did not adopt this label for the purposes of our 
study. 
According to Zillmann (2000), readers tend to form favourable attitudes towards morally good characters and to share their 
emotional states through an empathetic process. Several empirical studies have confirmed the notion that morally good characters 
enjoy affective empathy on the part of readers; however, these studies did not collect directly comparable data for morally bad 
characters (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Johnson, 2012; Stansfield & Bunce, 2014). Going beyond this limitation, the above-mentioned 
study by Krakowiak and Oliver (2012) did allow for a direct comparison. Results showed a dispositional bias towards morally good 
vs. bad and morally ambiguous characters, and this bias was predictive of both cognitive and affective components of enjoying the 
narratives. However, the self-produced narratives used by Krakowiak and Oliver show strong and numerous differences regarding both 
narrative content and verbal material on top of the experimental variable of CharacterGoodness vs. Badness. Therefore, the results 
obtained may also reflect some or all of the many other differences in textual variables. 
In contrast, the participants in our study read the same excerpt from a narrative written by an acknowledged author, with the only 
change being the short pieces of biographical information that we inserted at four points in the excerpt. To be sure, bad acts reported in 
actu are likely to impress readers more profoundly than references to a person’s past decades earlier. However, our design has the 
advantage that the experimental modification leaves the actual event that makes up the foreground of the narrative episode completely 
unchanged. As a result, the expectable version differences were likely to be far more subtle, but also far more selectively attributable to 
our very well-defined and quantitatively very limited experimental modification. 
Moreover, in contrast to Krakowiak and Oliver’s study (2012), the excerpt we used leaves it completely open how the narrative will 
conclude. This design feature implies that the potential positive effect of a morally bad character trait on aesthetic evaluation is not 
dependant on, or even a mere function of, being (re)evaluated in light of the final outcome. Rather, it is evaluated as an integral part of 
an unfinished and open-ended reading process and hence reflects what a reading trajectory is for most of the time before it finally 
comes to a conclusion. 
1.3. Targeted dimensions of readers’ responses and hypotheses 
The ratings we collected are all well-established in research on reading narratives. They comprise two types of ratings: text-focused 
and reader (person) state-focused ratings. Because our study was primarily interested in the effect of our experimental manipulation on 
the aesthetic evaluation of the three text versions, text-focused ratings were of preeminent interest. Only with regard to the key 
dimension of narrative suspense (cf. Anz, 1998; Berlyne, 1960; Carroll, 1996, 1996ab; Fill, 2007; Knoop et al., 2016; Lehne & Koelsch, 
2015; Löker, 1976; Madrigal & Bee, 2005; Zillmann, 1980) did we ask participants both how “suspenseful” they found the narrative 
(text-focus) and how much they actually felt themselves as going through a state of suspense (reader state-focus). All other ratings were 
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collected either with a primary focus on evaluating the text (see Table 1) or on reporting the subjective state experienced (see Tables S2 
and S3). 
In addition to “suspenseful,” text-focused evaluations included ratings for how “captivating” (fesselnd), “carrying one away” 
(mitreißend) (Cekaite & Björk-Willén, 2018; Jacobs, 2015) readers perceived the text versions to be. Importantly, all these rating items 
are nor just descriptive of a particular property of the respective texts, but also imply an aesthetically evaluative dimension in that high 
ratings typically reflect a superb power and hence an artistic achievement on the part of the stimulus, i.e., its particular power to hold 
us captive, carry us away, interest us, etc.. (Note that the ratings for the text’s power to “captivate” readers and “carry them away” 
should not be conflated with measures of the person states of captivation for which we did not collect ratings.) 
As the sudden blinding strikes both the protagonist and the reader without any forewarning, and in very unusual circumstances, we 
also collected ratings for how “surprising” readers perceived the text versions to be (for research on surprise, see Cheung et al., 2019; 
Hoeken & Van Vliet, 2000; Silvia, 2009). On a similar vein, a sudden and completely unexpected blinding without any apparent cause 
and prior warning is likely to trigger a cognitive interest into how and for what underlying reason it could possibly come about. We 
therefore also collected ratings for how “interesting” readers perceived the text versions (for this category in aesthetics, see Fayn, 
Silvia, Dejonckheere, Verdonck & Kuppens, 2019; Silvia, 2010). Given our anticipation of relatively high text-focused ratings for 
“suspenseful,” “captivating,” “surprising,” and “interesting”––even independently of version––, we decided to use “boring” as a control 
item. Ratings on this item should show low levels, if our assumptions regarding the other dimensions were to hold true. 
Mishaps and also intentional maltreatments of characters are integral parts of many narratives and almost mandatory in comedies 
(if only within certain limits). Considering the potential of misfortunes and bad behaviour for light-hearted entertainment, we decided 
to also collect ratings for how “entertaining” the passage was perceived to be. We expected a version effect for “entertaining” along the 
lines of the following reasoning: a good character who is suddenly struck blind has little, if any, potential for being entertaining, 
whereas this might not apply––at least not to the same degree––to a bad or even evil character. At the same time, Saramago’s narrative 
is clearly not primarily aimed at effects of entertainment; we therefore expected the overall levels of ratings to be lower for “enter-
taining” than for “suspenseful,” “captivating,” and “carrying away.” 
Theoretical poetics (for a brief discussion, see Menninghaus et al., 2017) and recent studies in media psychology (Oliver & Bartsch, 
2010; Oliver & Woolley, 2010) also entail provisions for morally evaluative paths from negative emotional content to positive 
appreciation by means of interpreting negative events as being “morally valuable” or “meaningful” in some ways. For our three 
versions of Saramago’s narrative, the construct of “poetic” or “narrative justice” (McGregor, 2018) might be specifically relevant. 
Readers might morally embrace the being struck blind of the protagonist as a just punishment for his past deeds in the bad and evil 
variants of the narrative. In contrast, a good character’s becoming blind cannot be morally embraced on these grounds. For this reason, 
we saw chances that the bad and the evil character versions of the narrative might score higher than the good character version on a 
scale for “morally valuable.” 
To render the picture more complete, we also collected three aesthetically evaluative ratings of a very general nature that place a 
primary focus on the formal making of the text versions: namely, how “beautiful,” “well-made,” and “aesthetically valuable” they were 
perceived to be. As neither the series of events depicted nor the imagery nor other stylistic features differed across the three exper-
imental versions of Saramago’s text, we did not expect any significant version effects for these measures. 
As to reader state-measures, we collected data on how our experimental modification may affect aspects of the readerly engage-
ment that play a great role in recent empirical research on reading processes altogether, particularly, sympathy, empathy, and 
perspective taking (cf. Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Stansfield & Bunce, 2014) as well as transportation with its facets of emotional 
involvement, imagination, and attention (cf. Green & Brock, 2000; Green et al., 2008; for all details regarding the items that we used, 
see the Section 2.3 Measures). Because texts that are rated as highly suspenseful as well as strong in their power to “captivate” readers 
and “carry them away” should almost by definition also strongly bind the readers’ attention, we expected potential enhancing effects of 
character badness on the text-focused ratings for “suspenseful,” “captivating,” and “carrying away” to go along with higher ratings for 
readerly states-focused measures of “attention.” 
Readers’ affective dispositions towards protagonists are frequently measured using scales for sympathy and empathy. Unfortu-
nately, the constructs of sympathy and empathy are often confounded in psychological research (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; Pinotti & 
Table 1 
Text-focused ratings.   
Bad Evil Good 
Evaluation items M SD M SD M SD 
suspenseful 5.51 (1.10) 4.83 (1.92) 4.86 (1.72) 
captivating 5.55 (1.26) 4.90 (1.92) 4.75 (1.71) 
carrying_away 4.98 (1.48) 4.90 (1.89) 4.75 (1.59) 
interesting 5.47 (1.16) 5.27 (1.75) 5.07 (1.52) 
boring 2.16 (1.46) 2.15 (1.62) 2.52 (1.64) 
entertaining 4.94 (1.27) 3.65 (1.72) 3.66 (1.68) 
surprising 5.22 (1.56) 5.02 (1.59) 5.07 (1.62) 
well_made 5.18 (1.30) 5.13 (1.67) 4.73 (1.45) 
aesthetically_valuable 4.14 (1.46) 4.08 (1.90) 3.98 (1.78) 
beautiful 3.61 (1.44) 3.25 (1.59) 3.39 (1.81) 
morally_valuable 3.76 (1.45) 3.73 (2.01) 3.34 (1.57)  
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Salgaro, 2019). Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) have argued that only sympathy, and not empathy, implies a moral evaluation of actions 
and characters––i.e., of whether or not another person morally deserves the situational predicament he/she finds himself/herself in. 
Studies by Coplan (2011) and Eisenberg (2010) support this understanding, and so does a neuropsychological study (Singer & Kli-
mecki, 2014). If this reasoning applies to our test case, the morally good vs. bad/evil character information added in our experimental 
modifications should reduce sympathy, but not empathy, for the bad and evil characters compared to the good one. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
We used mailing lists and social media channels to recruit participants for our online study. Five hundred thirty-three individuals 
visited the starting page of the online questionnaire, and 246 actually began to fill out the questionnaire. Of these, 196 completed it 
(110 in a first wave, 86 in a second wave). We excluded (a) 13 participants who showed an unrealistically high reading speed (for 
details see the subsection 2.5.1 Data Preprocessing below); (b) 40 participants who made errors in responding to the control questions; 
(c) 17 participants who reported that they had read the novel or seen the film, and (d) one participant who reported a language other 
than German as their native language. The final sample thus consisted of 141 participants. The mean age of the final sample was 39.9 
years (SD = 17.8, min = 18, max = 79), with 100 women (71%) and 41 men (29%). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three conditions (44, 49, and 48 for the GoodCharacter, BadCharacter, and EvilCharacter condition, respectively). 
There were no significant differences between the three groups regarding the person-related variables, with two exceptions: First, 
self-reported reading times for non-fiction literature was significantly higher for the EvilCharacter condition than for the BadCharacter 
condition and the GoodCharacter condition, 9.9 h (SD = 11.0) vs 5.2 h (SD = 7.0) and 5.7 h (SD = 6.8), respectively, F(2, 138) = 4.38, 
MSE = 73.2, p = .014. Second, the mean age was significantly lower for participants assigned to the GoodCharacter condition 
compared to participants assigned to the BadCharacter condition, with the mean age of readers of the EvilCharacter condition being in- 
between, 36.4 (SD = 18.3) vs. 44.5 (SD = 17.6) vs. 38.7 (SD = 17.0), F(2, 136) = 2.62, MSE = 310.7, p = .077). 
All experimental procedures were ethically approved by the Ethics Council of the Max Planck Society and were undertaken with the 
written informed consent of each participant. 
2.2. Stimuli 
All relevant information has already been provided in the Introduction. 
2.3. Measures 
2.3.1. Aesthetic and moral evaluation 
We assessed how readers aesthetically evaluate the three versions of the narrative using the items that were theoretically discussed 
in the introduction: “suspenseful,” “captivating,”, “carrying one away,” “interesting,” “boring” “gripping,” “entertaining,” “riveting,” 
“surprising,” “beautiful,” “well-made,” and “aesthetically valuable.” Ratings for “morally valuable” targeted the processing dimension 
of moral evaluation. All items were rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very beautiful / suspenseful / etc. 
2.3.2. Person states 
Empathy, perspective taking, and sympathy. We measured these constructs with items adopted from Busselle and Bilanzic 
(2009; see Supplemental Information Table S2 for the items that were used). These items as well as the transportation and felt suspense 
items (see below) were rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = does not at all apply to 7 = does strongly apply. The overall 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index was 0.85 (“meritorious”), and the parallel analysis suggested that three factors should be extracted. A 
factor analysis yielded three factors that are interpretable as Empathy, Sympathy, and Perspective Taking (see Supplemental Infor-
mation Table S2). We then calculated Cronbach’s alpha for each scale and dropped items that decreased Cronbach’s alpha. Finally, 
three scale scores were created by averaging the ratings for the items (reversing some items), with higher values indicating higher 
Empathy (ɑ = .87, M = 4.96, SD = 1.33), higher Sympathy (ɑ = .86, M = 4.43, SD = 1.47), and higher Perspective Taking (ɑ = .66, M 
= 4.99, SD = 1.33), respectively. 
Transportation and felt suspense. Transportation was measured using 12 items from the German version of the Transportation 
scale by Appel & Richter, 2010; Green and Brock (2000; see Supplemental Information Table S3 for the items that were used). To 
measure subjectively felt suspense, we adapted three items from a questionnaire designed to measure reading experiences (Appel, 
Koch, Schreier & Groeben, 2002, scale 6). The overall KMO index was 0.87 (“meritorious”), and the parallel analysis suggested that 
four factors be extracted. A factor analysis yielded four factors that are interpretable as Felt Suspense, Imagination, Emotional 
Involvement, and Attention (see Supplemental Information Table S3). Again, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha and dropped the items 
that decreased it. Four scale scores were created by averaging the ratings for the items (reversing some items), with higher values 
indicating higher Felt Suspense (ɑ = .90, M = 5.42, SD = 1.67), higher Imagery (ɑ = .78, M = 5.20, SD = 1.20), higher Emotional 
Involvement (ɑ = .70, M = 3.65, SD = 1.38), and higher Attention (ɑ = .52, M = 5.68, SD = 1.32), respectively. 
2.3.3. Person-related questionnaires and tests 
Author recognition test. We employed a German version (Hai Nhu, 2015) of the Author Recognition Test (ART; Stanovich & 
M. Salgaro et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Poetics xxx (xxxx) xxx
6
West, 1989) to evaluate the participants’ exposure to literature. The German version consists of 60 names of real authors and 60 foils; 
the scoring counts every hit (correct checking of an author’s name) with 1 and each false alarm (false checking of a foil’s name) with 
− 2. The sample showed a normal distribution of the ART score with a mean of M = 22.6 (SD = 9.35, min = 3, max = 46). 
Trait empathy. We assessed participants’ trait empathy with the Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen, the German version 
(Paulus, 2012) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), with the four subscales Fantasy Scale (FS; α = .76, M = 3.59, SD 
= 0.75), Emotional Concern (EC; α = .67, M = 3.77, SD = 0.61), Perspective Taking (PT; α = .76, M = 3.70, SD = 0.63), and Personal 
Distress (PD; α = .76, M = 2.86, SD = 0.75). In addition to measuring trait empathy, we also employed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
test (RMET) in order to assess participants’ affective theory of mind abilities (reading/recognition of facially expressed emotions; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001;Bölte, 2005; Pfaltz et al., 2013; M = 26.3, SD = 3.46, min = 15, max = 33). A 
correlation analysis revealed significant positive correlations between the subscales FS × EC: r = .56, FS × PT: r = .19, FS  × PD: r =
.22, and EC × PD: r = .24, and between FS × RMET score: r = .20. 
2.4. Procedure 
After filling out the German version of the ART, participants read one of the three experimental versions of the excerpt from 
Table 2 
Version contrasts of the text-focused ratings.  
Variable Contrast ηG2/est. MSE/SE DF F/t p 
Suspenseful  .038 2.59 (2, 138) 2.71 .070†
bad - evil 0.68 0.33 138 2.07 .040*  
bad - good 0.65 0.34 138 1.93 .055†
evil - good − 0.03 0.34 138 − 0.09 .928 
Captivating  .044 2.72 (2, 138) 3.18 .045*  
bad - evil 0.66 0.34 138 1.96 .052†
bad - good 0.80 0.34 138 2.34 .021*  
evil - good 0.15 0.34 138 0.42 .672 
Carrying away  .003 2.77 (2, 138) 0.22 .799  
bad - evil 0.08 0.34 138 0.25 .805  
bad - good 0.23 0.35 138 0.67 .507  
evil - good 0.15 0.35 138 0.42 .675 
nteresting  .012 2.22 (2, 138) 0.84 .434  
bad - evil 0.20 0.30 138 0.66 .513  
bad - good 0.40 0.31 138 1.30 .197  
evil - good 0.20 0.31 138 0.65 .516 
Boring  .012 2.48 (2, 138) 0.83 .438  
bad - evil − 0.02 0.32 138 − 0.06 .957  
bad - good 0.36 0.33 138 1.10 .273  
evil - good 0.38 0.33 138 1.15 .253 
Entertaining  .136 2.45 (2, 138) 10.82 <.001***  
bad - evil 1.29 0.32 138 4.07 <.001***  
bad - good 1.28 0.33 138 3.94 <.001***  
evil - good − 0.01 0.33 138 − 0.04 .968 
Surprising  .003 2.52 (2, 138) 0.22 .805  
bad - evil 0.20 0.32 138 0.63 .529  
bad - good 0.16 0.33 138 0.47 .636  
evil - good − 0.05 0.33 138 − 0.14 .887 
Well-made  .018 2.20 (2, 138) 1.28 .282  
bad - evil 0.06 0.30 138 0.20 .846  
bad - good 0.46 0.31 138 1.48 .141  
evil - good 0.40 0.31 138 1.29 .201 
Aesthetically valuable  .002 2.96 (2, 138) 0.11 .897  
bad - evil 0.06 0.35 138 0.17 .865  
bad - good 0.17 0.36 138 0.46 .644  
evil - good 0.11 0.36 138 0.30 .768 
Beautiful  .009 2.60 (2, 138) 0.62 .537  
bad - evil 0.36 0.33 138 1.11 .271  
bad - good 0.23 0.34 138 0.67 .501  
evil - good − 0.14 0.34 138 − 0.41 .686 
Morally valuable  .012 2.87 (2, 138) 0.85 .429  
bad - evil 0.03 0.34 138 0.08 .940  
bad - good 0.41 0.35 138 1.18 .241  
evil - good 0.39 0.35 138 1.10 .274 
Note. 
† p < .10. 
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
*** p < .001. 
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Saramago’s novel (each presented on 7 pages). Next, they answered seven control questions through which we checked whether the 
participants had read the text attentively. All further tasks were presented and responded to in the following order: the aesthetic 
evaluation items; questions regarding familiarity with the novel or the movie based on the novel; the RMET; the questions designed to 
measure sympathy, cognitive and affective empathy, transportation and felt suspense; and the questionnaire regarding trait empathy. 
Finally, demographic data and self-reports on reading habits were collected. 
2.5. Analysis 
2.5.1. Data preprocessing 
We first examined the reading times and analysed the control questions for the 196 participants who completed the questionnaire. 
The reading speed ranged from 1.8 words/min to 1707.9 words/min (due to participants who took longer breaks and then resumed the 
online questionnaire; excluding these participants, the high bound was 57.9 words/min). One hundred fifty-six participants made no 
errors in the control questions; 40 participants gave one or more incorrect answers. Reading speed (in words/min) and number of 
wrong answers (0–7) were significantly correlated (r = .47, p < .001; for log(wpm) × errors: r = .24, p < .001; Spearman’s ρ = .13, p =
.073). We excluded 13 participants (6.6%) with a reading speed higher than 600 words/min (a quite lenient exclusion criterion; see 
Rayner, Slattery & Bélanger, 2010), 40 participants with one or more incorrect answers to the seven control questions, and one 
participant whose native language was not German. All statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018). 
The raw data and analysis scripts are available at Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/p8xyh/). 
2.5.2. Statistical inference tests 
In order to test the hypotheses, we computed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) both on the single items measuring the aesthetic and 
moral evaluation of the text variants and on the mean score of the measures for the person states experienced during reading. The 
results of these analyses provided the basis for comparing the three text versions. 
3. Results 
3.1. Aesthetic evaluation 
As expected, and even independently of version, mean ratings for “suspenseful,” “captivating,” “carrying away,” “interesting,” and 
“surprising” were altogether relatively high, and ratings for “boring” were very low. Ratings for “entertaining,” “aesthetically valu-
able,” and “beautiful” centred around the midpoint of the scales (see Table 1 and Figure 1). 
The ANOVAs for the ratings for “captivating” and “entertaining” yielded significant results, F(2, 138) = 3.18, MSE = 2.72, p = .045, 
ηG2 = .044 and F(2, 138) = 10.82, MSE = 2.45, p < .001, ηG2 = .136, respectively. The ANOVA for the “suspenseful” ratings yielded an 
only marginally significant effect, F(2, 138) = 2.71, MSE = 2.59, p = .070, ηG2 = .038, and hence call for a cautious interpretation. 
We obtained the following significant differences between the three experimental text versions (for details see Table 2):  
(1) The BadCharacter version was rated as significantly more “captivating” and “entertaining” than the GoodCharacter version, t =
2.34, p = .021 and t = 3.94, p < .001. Ratings for “suspenseful” are also higher for the BadCharacter version, but this effect is 
only marginally significant.  
(2) The BadCharacter version was also rated as significantly more “suspenseful” and “entertaining” than the EvilCharacter version, 
t = 2.07, p = .040 and t = 4.07, p < .001, respectively. Ratings for “captivating” show a trend in the same direction, yet the effect 
is only marginally significant.  
(3) The ratings for the GoodCharacter and the EvilCharacter versions do not differ significantly on any of the 11 aesthetically 
evaluative dimensions (all ps > 0.2). 
Thus, we found a marked preference for the BadCharacter version over both the Good- and the EvilCharacter versions based on 
three of the eleven aesthetically evaluative ratings. Qualitatively, the result pattern is analogous for several of the other dimensions, 
including “interesting,” “surprising,” and “well-made,” yet the version differences fail to reach significance. 
These results support the findings made in emotion psychology that were summarized under the formula “Bad is stronger than 
good” (see section 1 Introduction); they extend this formula beyond the mere strength of emotional affection to distinct degrees of 
perceived aesthetic appeal. At the same time, we show a non-linear limitation to this rule: Pushing badness to the level of evilness, 
erases the aesthetic benefits of badness rather than further enhancing them. As a result, the morally most divergent versions, i.e. the 
Good- and the EvilCharacter versions, do not show any significant differences on the scales for aesthetic evaluation. 
This pattern of results not only strikingly confirms that aesthetic and moral evaluation are categorically different processing 
routines, at least within certain limits; it also provides strong empirical evidence for the notion that moral badness can positively 
contribute to and even enhance aesthetic enjoyment. 
As predicted by our theoretical reasoning, the preference for the Bad- over the Good- and EvilCharacter versions of the excerpt is 
reflected in rating items that by definition include affectively positive and negative experiential dimensions (i.e., “suspenseful”) or are 
at least open to including negative emotion teasers (the “entertaining” quality), but not in items such as “beautiful” and “well-made,” 
which are wholly positive in valence. 
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3.2. Moral evaluation 
Our data do not show a version effect for “morally valuable” as predicted by the construct of “poetic justice,” namely, that the fate 
of being struck blind might be more morally valuable if it affects a bad or an evil character rather than a good one. We only obtained 
evidence for a trend in this direction. 
3.3. Person state measures 
The multi-item measures administered for Empathy, Perspective Taking, as well as for Emotional Involvement, and Imagination (i. 
e., the three dimensions of Transportation) yielded no significant differences between the versions. In contrast, the ANOVAs for the 
mean scores for Felt Suspense, Attention and Sympathy did show significant differences between the text versions (see Table 3 and 
Fig. 2). 
The ANOVAs for the mean scores for Felt Suspense as well as for Attention were marginally significant, F(2, 138) = 2.63, MSE =
2.40, p = .076, ηG2 = .037, and F(2, 138) = 2.90, MSE = 1.69, p = .058, ηG2 = .040, respectively. The higher ratings for the text-focused 
attribute “suspenseful” are mirrored, and thereby consolidated, specifically in significantly higher ratings for subjectively Felt Sus-
pense for the Bad- compared to the EvilCharacter version, t = 2.11, p = .037. As predicted by the studies that emphasize an attentional 
negativity bias of our emotional dispositions (Carretié, Mercado, Tapia & Hinojosa, 2001; Delplanque, Silvert, Hot, Rigoulot & 
Sequeira, 2006; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen & Chartrand, 2003), Attention scores are significantly higher for the EvilCharacter version 
and higher by trend for the BadCharacter version compared to the GoodCharacter version, t = 2.21, p = .029 and t = 1.97, p = .051, 
respectively. 
The ANOVA for the mean score for Sympathy yielded a significant version effect, F(2, 138) = 3.47, MSE = 2.09, p = .034, ηG2 = .048. 
The EvilCharacter version scores were significantly lower than both the Good- and the BadCharacter versions, t = 2.41, p = .018 and t 
= 2.12, p = .036. At the same time, in line with similar findings by Zillmann and Cantor (1977), Sympathy and Empathy did not 
Fig. 1. Mean ratings for the aesthetic and moral evaluation measures. Error bars represent the 95% CI. Significant differences between the con-
ditions are designated by p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Table 3 
Person (Reader)-focused mean scores.   
Bad Evil Good 
Person states M SD M SD M SD 
Sympathy 4.61 (1.31) 3.99 (1.61) 4.72 (1.40) 
Empathy 5.05 (1.31) 4.85 (1.39) 5.00 (1.32) 
Perspective Taking 4.99 (1.44) 4.77 (1.19) 5.23 (1.32) 
Emotional Involvement 3.67 (1.35) 3.85 (1.56) 3.42 (1.20) 
Imagination 5.47 (1.09) 5.04 (1.39) 5.07 (1.08) 
Attention 5.83 (1.27) 5.90 (1.21) 5.30 (1.42) 
Felt Suspense 5.82 (1.13) 5.16 (1.93) 5.24 (1.47)  
M. Salgaro et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Poetics xxx (xxxx) xxx
9
significantly differ for the Good and the BadCharacter versions (t < 1, p = .73, and t < 1, p = .84 for Sympathy and Empathy, 
respectively). Hence in this regard, too, we observed an adverse effect of badness only for the text version in which badness was pushed 
to the level of evilness. 
This result differs from that obtained by Krakowiak and Oliver (2012) who did report a negative effect of their BadCharacter 
version on Sympathy. Our data do not put us in a position to tell apart whether this difference in results reflects the great differences in 
the experimental modifications between the two studies or other differences of the underlying texts. 
The results for Empathy do not show any significant version effect at all. This result lends at least partial support to the under-
standing referred-to above that Sympathy is more likely to involve morally judgmental dimensions compared to Empathy. 
4. Discussion 
Our experimental case study on the poetics and aesthetics of character choice in narratives provides evidence that a general finding 
of the positive psychology of emotions—namely, “bad is stronger than good”—accords well with higher ratings for important di-
mensions of aesthetic reward and concomitant enjoyment when reading a Bad- vs. a GoodCharacter version of a literary narrative. 
Most notably, even though the differences were only small, the BadCharacter version was rated as more “suspenseful,” “captivating,” 
and “entertaining” compared to both the Good und the EvilCharacter version. For all other aesthetically evaluative dimensions for 
which we collected ratings we obtained no significant differences between the three versions. Moreover, in line with both Aristot-
le’sreasoning and recent findings of inverted u-shape functions, pushing badness to an extreme level (the EvilCharacter version) erased 
rather than enhanced all advantageous aesthetic effects distinctive of the BadCharacter version. 
The adverse effect of the EvilCharacter version on aesthetic evaluation went along with an adverse effect on sympathy. In contrast, 
the Good and the BadCharacter versions did not differ neither in sympathy nor in empathy. This strikingly highlights the degree to 
which the reading of fictional narratives enjoys special licenses. Given that the deeds of perpetrators do not harm any real persons, 
readers can feel free from the “reality check” and circumvent the morally evaluative routines expected in real contexts in favour of 
obtaining higher aesthetic rewards. This applies even more so as fictional persons—in contrast to real ones—simply cannot be helped 
by the reader under any circumstance (Vaage, 2013; see also Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). Again, however, this license for fiction appears to 
have limits, as it does not aesthetically redeem excessive departures from moral values as in the Evil Character condition. 
We see some indications that our findings may well apply beyond a cognitive art framing. The public fascination with criminals 
performing spectacular coups and even with serial murders suggests a positive attention, intensity, and memory effect also for real-life 
bad characters and potentially even for individuals that might well deserve being labelled “evil” characters. Studies on such cases 
might shed further light on the topic investigated in this article. 
4.1. Limitations and future directions 
As this is a single case study, our results cannot readily be generalized to other narratives and call for replications. One could also 
Fig. 2. Mean scores for the person state-measures. Error bars represent the 95% CI. Significant differences between the conditions are designated by 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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suspect that the failure of the EvilCharacter condition to share the aesthetic benefits of the BadCharacter condition may reflect a special 
effect of the Nazi past of this character on our German participants. To be sure, Hollywood cinema has turned Nazi figures, not without 
substantial degrees of fascination, into internationally notorious emblems of evilness; still, the effects of these figures on Germans may 
differ from those on non-Germans. This, however, is far from certain for the more recent generation, yet could readily be tested by 
drawing on participants from countries other than Germany. 
Furthermore, many of the individual effects reported are small, and the statistical evidence is rather weak, calling for a cautious 
interpretation of the data. At the same time, the multiple weak effects do point in a similar direction, most notably, in the case of the 
text-focused ratings for “suspenseful” and the person-state ratings for subjectively felt “suspense,” and the convergent version effect on 
ratings for “captivating.” We therefore see reasons to believe that the many small effects obtained do reflect consequences of the 
experimental manipulations—i.e., of the insertion of a few words of background information regarding the protagonists distant past. 
Finally, the study presented here has a primary focus on potential aesthetic benefits of character badness for the processing of 
narratives. Importantly, our findings do by no means rule out that character goodness and good acts can likewise––on grounds other 
than the specific psychological mechanisms that motivated our study design and with regard to processing dimensions we did not 
cover––make important contributions not just to aesthetic, but also to moral evaluation (Zillmann, 2000). Future research may study 
the potential co-presence and interaction of such effects. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2021.101550. 
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